

The opinion of men of knowlege and judgment in New York, before the complexion of yr. house was known, was that their Convention might be induced to adjourn, & such was the plan proposed by the friends of the Constitution. . . .

1. RC, Madison Papers, DLC. Printed: Rutland, *Madison*, XI, 103–5. For a longer excerpt, see RCS:Va., 1596–97.

2. The reference is to Coxe's essay signed "A Pennsylvanian" that was first printed in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on 11 June (below). It has not been located in any extant Virginia or North Carolina newspaper.

Henry Knox to Otho Holland Williams New York, 11 June 1788 (excerpt)¹

You ask in your letter which I have considered as a public one, respecting the line of conduct that will probably be pursued by this state. In a word the antifederal interest is so powerful as to give them a majority of 45 or 46 out of 66.² They are obstinate and artful. They will not probably have the hardihood to openly reject the constitution should Virginia adopt it, but they will adjourn to a distant day.³ They will in the mean time consult on the conduct which will best promote their policy. Every thing rests on the decision of Virginia—If she will adopt the constitution all things will be easy notwithstanding the crooked policy of this State and Rhode Island. . . .

1. RC, Williams Papers, Maryland Historical Society. This letter was marked "(private)." Williams (1749–1794), a pre-Revolutionary War merchant, was a Continental Army officer who rose from the rank of lieutenant (1775) to that of brigadier general (1782). After the war, he settled in Baltimore, where, in 1783, he was appointed state naval officer for the Baltimore district. In 1789 President George Washington appointed him collector of the Port of Baltimore.

2. Two days later Knox wrote to Benjamin Lincoln that the Antifederalists had a majority of "47 out of 66."

3. Pennsylvanian James Wilson agreed. He believed that "New York is certainly anti-federal; but many think that, after a Ratification by nine States, she will not hazard a Vote of Rejection" (to Arthur St. Clair, 10 June, Peter Force Miscellany, DLC).

A Pennsylvanian to the New York Convention Pennsylvania Gazette, 11 June 1788

In May and June Tench Coxe, a prolific Philadelphia essayist, addressed newspaper essays to the Virginia and New York conventions encouraging the delegates in these important states to ratify the Constitution. He addressed the Virginia Convention using the pseudonym "An American" and the New York Convention as "A Pennsylvanian." Coxe identified himself as the author of these essays in various letters, including two to James Madison, a delegate to the Virginia Convention, and two to William Bingham, a Pennsylvania delegate

to Congress in New York City. (See Coxe to Madison, 19 May and 11 June, [RCS:Va., 833, 1596]; and Bingham to Coxe, 25 May [above] and 12 June [below]. For more on his authorship of both essays, see CC:751, 780.) Moreover, drafts of “An American” and “A Pennsylvanian,” in Coxe’s handwriting, are in the Coxe Papers, Series III, Essays, Addresses, and Resource Material, at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. There are no significant differences between the draft of “A Pennsylvanian” and the newspaper version.

“An American” was published in two parts in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on 21 and 28 May and “A Pennsylvanian” was published in that newspaper on 11 June. Coxe transmitted copies of “An American” to William Bingham, who thought it would have “a very good Effect on the Minds of the People” of New York. Bingham promised to get the essay reprinted in New York City and to show it to Alexander Hamilton to “take his opinion with respect to any exceptionable Passages” (Bingham to Coxe, 25 May, above). The first part of “An American” was reprinted in the *Daily Advertiser* on 9, 10, 12, and 13 June. Coxe also sent copies of “A Pennsylvanian” to Bingham, who promised to give copies to John Jay and Hamilton before they left for the New York Convention in Poughkeepsie on 13 June. Bingham thought the address was “well calculated to affect their Passions, as well as Interests” (Bingham to Coxe, 12 June, below). On 14 and 17 June the *Daily Advertiser* reprinted “A Pennsylvanian.” The essay was also reprinted in its entirety in the *Pittsburgh Gazette*, 26 July, 2 August, and in excerpted form in the *New Haven Gazette*, 19 June, and the *Massachusetts Centinel*, 5 July. (Coxe also hoped that “A Pennsylvanian” would be reprinted in Virginia, North Carolina, and New Hampshire—the states that had not yet ratified the Constitution. Reprintings, however, have not been located in any of the newspapers of those states.)

For more on the publication and circulation of “A Pennsylvanian” outside New York, see CC:780, and note 1 (below).

To the Honorable the CONVENTION of the STATE of NEW-YORK.

By the permission of divine providence, and from that large proportion of freedom which has been dispensed to the United States, your honorable body is very soon to deliberate on the nature and consequences of the proposed foederal constitution. The performance of a duty such as this is the most dignified temporal act of human nature. The temper and dispositions, therefore, with which it should be undertaken, ought to be as pure as those with which a pious man would approach the temple of the Deity. Moderation, candor, patience, mutual deference, and a kind conciliating spirit should suggest and govern every thought, word and deed.

The present address will go to you from another state—not dictated by any person, from whose views or connexions in your internal politics you may have entertained well grounded apprehensions—but totally unknown to every citizen of your commonwealth. The object of it is not a reconsideration of the subject at large, but an examination into

a few important particulars, and an attempt to look forward to some future consequences.

The manner in which the powers of the proposed constitution will be invested in the fœderal executive and legislature is the first point that presents itself to our minds. Will the house of representatives be named by little corrupt boroughs?—No, for there must be 30000 electors to send one. Will they be self-elected?—No, for every citizen whom the state legislatures will permit to elect the most democratic branch of their separate governments, will have a right to say who shall represent him in the fœderal house. The creation of that house is immediately by the voice of the people. If they shall say let *this man* be our fœderal representative, he will be so.

Will the senators, or second branch, as in other countries, be by hereditary descent? No—Will an idiot of 21, or an aged villain, whose long life has been devoted to the ruin of his country, have, as in England, an indefeasible right to a seat in the senate? No, for the elections of the members of that house is assigned to the state legislatures, whom the people themselves will chuse. Surely we cannot fear to trust the state legislatures with the choice of our fœderal senators. We shall chuse those bodies *freely* and *cautiously*, with a view to this and other important duties. If we elect wise and honest men as our state representatives, they will chuse wise and honest men as our fœderal senators. Were the people at large to chuse the senators, then the government would be termed consolidated or national, and not fœderal. The state legislatures would not have that separate branch of representation and legislation, which is necessary to maintain their independency and *the fœderal quality* of the government. It would be an improper and dangerous abridgement of the powers of the state governments to take the election of the senate out of their hands, yet even that power comes to them only with the consent and by the agency of the people, excercised originally in person. Can a citizen of any one of the states be restrained or prevented from giving his voice for the fœderal representatives, or for those who are to elect the senators, president or vice-president? Will any man hold the office of a representative, a senator or president, by any means but the votes of the people first given directly in his favor, or given for those who shall elect him to his office? On this point we may surely affirm that all the powers of the fœderal government flow, through a very short channel, from THE SACRED FOUNTAIN OF THE PEOPLE.

A simple but very important remark on the exercise of a power thus safely created is, that when a law shall be made by that power, which

concerns the people, it will equally affect the lives, liberties and property of the fœderal representatives, senate and president—A most comfortable fact, and an effectual restraint on human folly and wickedness, against which government is intended to provide.

Some gentlemen of your state have believed, that however free the government may be, it is still exceptionable, as being consolidated and not fœderal. Permit me to ask your dispassionate attention to a few plain facts in the constitution itself.

The fœderal government contains no power to prohibit or punish the most atrocious murders or immoral crimes—nor to fix the qualifications which are to entitle their constituents to elect—they cannot appoint one militia officer, nor train the national militia—they cannot take any step towards the election of a senator, representative or president—they cannot erect or regulate courts for the determination of civil causes between citizens of the same state, or for the punishment of crimes committed within the jurisdiction of any state—nor can they appoint or commission any *state* officer, civil or military.—What nation is there now existing whose government cannot do these things? What nation can exist, if these things are not done and provided for? Does it not therefore follow, that the several members of the confederacy (i. e. the several state governments) must, as heretofore, do these and many other matters of a like nature, which are necessary to the good order, and even to the existence of society. Before we dismiss this point, it will be necessary to attend very particularly to one more fact relating to it. *The sovereign power* of altering and amending the constitution, or supreme law of the American confederacy, does not lie with this fœderal legislature, whom some have erroneously apprehended to be supreme—That power, which is truly and evidently *the real point of sovereignty*, is vested in the several legislatures and conventions of the states, chosen by the people respectively within them. The fœderal government cannot alter the constitution, the people at large by their own agency cannot alter the constitution, but the representative bodies of the states, that is their *legislatures and conventions*, only can execute these acts of sovereign power.

From the foregoing circumstances results another reflection equally satisfactory and important, which is, that as the fœderal legislature cannot effect dangerous alterations which they might desire, *so they cannot prevent such wholesome alterations and amendments as are now desired, or which experience may hereafter suggest*. Let us suppose any one or more alterations to be in contemplation by the people at large, or by the state legislatures. If two thirds of those legislatures require it, Congress *must* call a general convention, even though they dislike the proposed

amendments, and if three fourths of the state legislatures or conventions approve such proposed amendments, they become *an actual and binding part of the constitution*, without any possible interference of Congress. If then, contrary to the opinion of the eight adopting states, the fœderal government should prove dangerous, it seems the members of the confederacy will have a full and uncontroulable power to alter its nature, and render it completely safe and useful.

It cannot be doubted that a great majority of your honorable house think a fœderal constitution for the United States of America expedient and highly necessary. The object of their desires then must be to obtain the best that can be devised, but not to be disappointed in procuring it. Let me respectfully request of those who wish the proposed plan amended, that they seriously consider how much more easy it will be to obtain those amendments under the forms of the constitution itself, than by previously attempting another general convention. Three fourths of the states concurring will ensure *any amendments*, after the adoption of nine or more; but at present *all* must concur, or we lose not only the amendments desired, but unfortunately the union itself—and with that the prosperity of the country and the peace and happiness of the people. Will it not be better to ratify a constitution which was formed by men chosen by the state legislatures and the people, and which secures to the people and their state representatives full power to alter and amend it, and which provides that it shall not be altered by any other authority?

Should the proposed constitution not take effect, there can be little doubt but that a vigorous and serious plan of *co-operation* will be adopted by Connecticut and New-Jersey, to secure a share of your impost, in proportion to their consumption of your imports. They will have no occasion to appeal to arms. Cheaper and more effectual modes of procedure may be adopted. Their respective legislatures have already commenced *a war of laws* in the case of the light-house, and the small craft.¹ It is impossible for any vessel bound to or from New-York to determine whether she may or may not be obliged to anchor in Sandy-hook road: That place belongs to Jersey, and were they to pass a law that every vessel which should anchor therein should pay a duty of two and an half per cent. on all her goods, and a tonnage of one third of a dollar, to a collector who should be fixed there, it would be impossible to prevent the operation of the law. Congress at present have no power to prevent such a law, and Jersey might truly urge that all vessels that go into your ports pay such duties. Both Connecticut and Jersey might also pass acts at the same time, imposing exactly the same duties on all goods imported from your state, which are, or from time to time shall

be, laid on articles of the same kinds imported into your state from foreign countries. They might also prohibit any shallops or small craft from going into their ports from yours without a special permission, at the time of granting which all the force of oaths, bonds, securities, &c. might be previously required for the due and faithful reporting of all goods imported in them. The combined spirit of *interest and resentment* would sharpen the ingenuity of their legislatures, and a few strict laws might be easily framed, that would either cut up your lucrative communication with them, or compel you to grant them a share of the impost. They would have no occasion to use force; but should you hastily appeal to arms, we may venture to affirm, without derogating from the prowess of your citizens, that the militia of Connecticut and New-Jersey would not be contemptible antagonists. These ideas are by no means held out with a view to alarm. They are delivered with sincerity and respect. Indeed we cannot suppose there is the least danger of the matter taking that turn. The contest must be entirely conducted by the legislatures of those suffering states, whose legal measures, if properly taken, cannot be rendered abortive.

The article of the new constitution relating to the regulation of elections has been very much misconceived. Permit me to ask your attention to a short examination of it. The 4th section it will be found relates merely to the mode of conducting an election, the other parts of the constitution fixing those essential points which are necessary to the preservation of liberty. They stand thus.

1st. The members of the house of representatives are to be chosen every second year—and the members of the senate every sixth year—These are the fixed terms of existence of the two branches.

When the 4th section gives the legislature of each state the power of prescribing, in the first instance, the time of *holding* those elections, we cannot on reflection suppose it was meant to give to each of them the power of altering the constitution in so important a matter as *the duration* of the legislature. No, it was merely the time of day or the month in which such an election should be held that was meant to be submitted to them. The frequency of elections is better guarded. Two seasons the convention well knew were necessary to be attended to in this agricultural country. The time of *seeding* and the time of *harvest*. These vary in the different states. Rice is planted and cut in Carolina in months different from those of seed time and harvest in New-York. Therefore a general day could not be fixed in the constitution, but was left to the legislatures. Yet a danger was possible and evident. Another Rhode-Island might start up among us, and regardless of the preservation of the union might omit to prescribe either time, place or manner of holding elections, by which our confederacy might be destroyed

by the smallest member. Congress therefore were vested also with the power just given to the legislatures—that is, the power of prescribing merely the circumstances under which elections shall be *holden*, not the qualifications of the electors, nor those of the elected—nor the duration of the senate—nor the duration of the representatives. These are prescribed by the constitution, *unalterably by Congress*, though the state legislatures can each of them fix the qualifications of the electors of representatives within their jurisdiction, and three fourths of the state legislatures or conventions can alter these and every other article relating to the elections of the fœderal representatives, senate, president, and all other officers of the general government. But let us proceed to the other essential points relating to elections which Congress cannot alter.

2dly. A representative must be 25, a senator must be 30, and a president must be 35 years.

3dly. The representatives and senators must be citizens of the states that send them—the senators must have been American citizens nine years, and the president must be *now* a citizen of some one state, or a natural born citizen hereafter.

4thly. None can elect senators or representatives but in their own state.

5thly. The day of the electors of the president giving their votes must be the same throughout the union.

6thly. Each state has *the exclusive power* of fixing the qualifications of the electors of the fœderal representatives within their respective territory and jurisdiction.

7thly. The state legislatures have *the exclusive right* of electing the fœderal senators.

Those seven important articles relating to the fœderal elections are *fixed* by the constitution, and not alterable by Congress. On considering the remarks made on the power of prescribing the time of *holding* elections, and applying them in the same way to the other two points, it will be found that the 4th section was necessary to the preservation of the union—that it will be useful when invasions or insurrections prevent the sitting of the state legislatures, or when a secession in any state legislature shall prevent a quorum from being obtainable. After providing for the qualifications of the electors and the elected, and the duration of the legislature, there can be no danger in leaving the time of day or year, or place, where government will be undisturbed, and the voting by ballot or *viva voce* to be fixed, and that, in the second place by the fœderal government. In the time of the late war the legislatures of New-York and Pennsylvania ordered elections for their invaded cities

and counties to be held in other places, and even at this day two districts of the county of Philadelphia elect in the city (which is a separate county in its own right) for the purpose of saving expence to the good people of those two districts. On due consideration of the fourth section, and remembering how it is limited by the other important and unalterable provisions of the constitution relating to elections, you will perceive, it is hoped, that the power given by that article is too small to affect the liberties of the people, and that it will prevent many serious inconveniences and evils.

It is asked by a writer of your state, who chuses to call himself a Plebeian² in a free and equal government, which rejects every preposterous distinction of blood or titles—it is asked, I say, by this writer, what is the condition of our country? What is there in it disagreeable or alarming? Permit me to tell you. A single fact ought to fix our public credit in foreign countries—that so far from paying the principal or interest of money advanced in the hour of need and distress to purchase the means of establishing the independency of the United States, we have borrowed money to pay *the interest*³—a greater proof of either inability or disinclination, a stronger persuasive not to trust us more, cannot be given—this loan to pay the interest unhappily is *upon interest also*. The canker worm of *interest upon interest* is eating up the produce of our fields, and even the lands we cultivate. *This, in regard to foreign credit, is the condition of our country*. But let us look at home for some more pleasing facts. Tho' foreign powers do not receive their interest, what is the situation of private foreigners, who have placed their monies in our funds? They have thousands and tens of thousands in certificates, on some of which near half the amount of the original loan is due for interest. Ye friendly foreigners, who have given us your monies in the hour of our distress, have patience with us, till complicated evils shall teach us to seek the blessings of government, and we will pay you all. Tho' we do not render justice to our powerful supporters and allies, nor to their friendly subjects, do we give to our own citizens their due? Some of the states are paying a part of their arrears of interest in paper currencies, depreciated from seven and a half to eighty per cent. The interest on others is paid in facilities or indents, worth but four shillings in the pound, and the remainder receive *no interest at all*. The medium value of the certificates of public debts, computing it upon the principal and interest, does not exceed twenty per cent. or one dollar for five. *This then, in regard to public credit at home, is the condition of our country*. But how stands private faith, and the obligations of contracts? Ask your merchants and other citizens, who have monies due in New-Jersey, the three

southern states, and Rhode-Island. In Jersey and North-Carolina they can compel payment of their debts, but must receive a paper money, depreciated 25 per cent. In South-Carolina an instalment law prevents them receiving more than one third of their demand, and that in a paper currency, worth no more than 16 or 17 shillings in the pound. In Georgia and Rhode-Island they have a paper lawful tender, depreciated four fifths. *This then is the condition of our country, in regard to private business*, to the utter subversion of common honesty, and the rights of property. 'Tis a posture of affairs, that would corrupt the angels of light, and the friends of virtue, and our country must shudder at the consequences of these alarming facts. How recent was the insurrection under Daniel Shays,⁴ and how much more recent was the business of the Genesee country, within your own territory and jurisdiction. 'Tis a case of delicacy, but it will serve to explain the present condition of America, if you develope that matter compleatly, and satisfy yourselves of the true reasons why Massachusetts sold so cheaply and hastily to one company their extensive and valuable grant.⁵ But I shall cease to lead your attention to obvious facts, which unhappily wants neither the feeble aid of my pen, nor those "*powers of rhetoric*" the Plebeian speaks of, to prove our situation most painful and alarming.

The consequences to your state, which may follow the rejection of the proposed constitution, should certainly engage a great share of your deliberations. In the event of nine states adopting, Jersey and Connecticut will no longer receive their supplies through you, nor send their produce to your market for sale, for you will then be on the footing of foreigners. This must enable both those states to make commercial establishments of their own, more respectable than they can ever be if you continue in the American union. 'Tis evident that so far as they succeed it must be entirely at the expence of your trade, especially Jersey, which has at present none of her own. In your capital are many foreign merchants, whose object is *the trade of the United States*, and not that of New-York *only*. These gentlemen, with many of your native merchants, will find it impossible to contend with the embarrassments that must ensue, should New-York become a foreign port. The manufacturers of your state will suffer equally with your commerce, in the event of your ceasing to be a part of the union, for you cannot support a duty of five per cent. upon all your articles, greater imposts on particulars, and prohibitions of others, which will unquestionably take place. Your farmers will be still more deeply injured in the sale of their produce, should your state unhappily place herself upon the footing of foreign countries. The amount of the injury to them may be

easily ascertained, by examining how much iron, flour, biscuit, indian-corn, hams, lard, butter, tallow, &c. and other produce of their farms, are exported to the eastern and southern states. These things will be most seriously felt throughout your whole commonwealth, but to the islands of New-York, Long-Island and Staten-Island they will be almost ruinous. These three districts must act together, they are peculiarly placed by nature. Should they fear the ruin of their commerce and manufactures, and the foreign duty on such of their produce as they may send to the ports of the new union, should these considerations induce the honest opponents of the constitution among them to adhere to the new confederacy, what can prevent their secession? If Staten-Island were to associate herself with New-Jersey, to which nature has almost joined her, and the Islands of New-York and Long-Island with Connecticut, those two respectable states, and the new union itself, would be bound to defend them. They would be at peace till attacked by you, and before your people would commence any hostile proceedings, they would consider well the enormous expence of an offensive war, they would remember the dangers to which an invading army is subjected, and they would not be unmindful of the inequality of the force with which your dismembered state would have to contend. Vermont too, seizing the opportunity, might at once effect her separation from you, and maintain her independency. New-York and the former union have for certain reasons thought fit to overlook her suppression of your authority.⁶ There can be little doubt but those reasons, strengthened by her connexion with the new union and the secession of your three Islands, would secure the peaceful independency of those four valuable districts.

In such a state of matters, what would be the depreciation of your public securities, what the depreciation of your paper medium, what the consequent discontents among your own people, and what the injuries to commerce by a fluctuating and wounded currency?

Suppose for a moment the city and county of New-York to have separated themselves from your government. Both banks of the Hudson would then belong to the new confederacy. The destruction of your foreign trade must be the inevitable consequence, for a heavy toll might be laid on every ship that should pass between the Island of New-York and the county of Bergen—or a total prohibition might prevent their passing at all.

To complete your difficulties, internal discord would rend the bosom of your state. Without derogating from the wealth, character or abilities of the gentlemen who oppose the constitution, you will readily admit

that there is a very numerous, intelligent and respectable part of every county in your state attached to the union, and friendly to the proposed government. Between these and the opposing interest there would be a never ceasing and ruinous contention.

Tho' the United States are not now, nor are not, as we conceive, intended to be under a general government, competent to internal purposes, yet we are so far *one people*, that all general national maxims apply forcibly and properly to our situation. Among them is one dear to the friends of liberty, that the voice of the people is the voice of God. If we review the treatment the proposed constitution has received from other conventions, we shall find that, instead of half, nearly two thirds of the states have already adopted it—and that these contain not only a majority, but two thirds of the free people of the union. Virginia too will certainly ratify it. An adoption by your state now may therefore be considered as an acquiescence in the sense of the majority of the nation, of which we form a part—THE GREAT LAW OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENTS.

1. For several years New Jersey had been angered by New York's state impost and with New York's steadfast refusal to ratify the congressional Impost of 1783 under conditions acceptable to Congress. New Jersey strongly supported this impost. In April 1787 the New York legislature passed a law increasing fees on vessels carrying dutiable goods. Although the act made concessions to the neighboring states by actually reducing some fees, New Jersey farmers objected to the fees on decked vessels under twenty tons burden carrying American produce that under a previous law had entered New York without charge. In June the New Jersey legislature retaliated by levying a tax of £30 per month on the lighthouse that New York had built on Sandy Hook, located in New Jersey. In March 1788 New York exempted American ships of less than fifty tons without dutiable goods on board. (See William F. Zornow, "The Sandy Hook Lighthouse Incident of 1787," *Journal of Economic History*, XIV [1954], 261–66.)

2. See "A Plebeian: An Address to the People of the State of New York," 17 April (RCS:N.Y., 946–47).

3. For example, on 1 June 1787, John Adams—the American minister to Great Britain and to The Netherlands—signed an agreement for a Dutch loan of one million florins (\$400,000). The loan was necessary, in part, to pay interest due on Dutch loans obtained the previous June. On 11 October, Congress approved the loan (JCC, XXXIII, 412–15, 649).

4. Shays's Rebellion in Massachusetts began in the summer of 1786 and was finally suppressed by the state in early February 1787.

5. Between 30 November and 16 December 1786, agents from New York and Massachusetts met in Hartford, Conn., to resolve a dispute between the two states over much of western New York. The agents hammered out an agreement by which New York was to retain sovereignty over the land within its borders while Massachusetts was given legal title to the land. On 1 April 1788 Nathaniel Gorham, Oliver Phelps, and others paid the state of Massachusetts £300,000 Massachusetts currency for a portion of the western land totaling 6,000,000 fertile acres that was known as "the Genesee country." The purchase

price was to be paid in three installments in depreciated consolidated securities of Massachusetts.

6. In 1777 Vermont declared its independence from New York and Great Britain. Later in the year it adopted its own constitution. For the failure of New York to obtain the support of Congress and the other states to suppress the rebellion, see RCS:N.Y., Vol. 1, xxxii; Kaminski, *Clinton*, 63–77.

William Bingham to Tench Coxe

New York, 12 June 1788¹

I am much indebted to you for the agreeable & important Communications contained in your Letter of the 10th. Inst

The Ratification of Virginia will be an essential Accession of foederal Force—Without her Cooperation & Assistance, the Union would not possess So robust a Constitution, nor be endued with strength, Sufficient to resist the Difficulties it will probably have to encounter

Mr Jay & Col Hamilton leave New York to Morrow, to meet the State Convention

I Shall present each of them with a Copy of the Address, which is well calculated to affect their Passions, as well as Interests²—Your particular Injunctions Shall be attended to—The most Sanguine Advocates for the foederal System only flatter themselves with the hopes that the Convention will adjourn, & not reject; so great & So determined a Majority is opposed to the Ratification—however, the future Prospects of this State, with respect to an Extension of her foreign Commerce & of her internal Resources, are So intimately connected with the Union; that I am disposed to think the People will Soon change their Sentiments & become foederal—

PS. Accept the inclosed from your obed hb s[ervant]

1. RC, Coxe Papers, Series II, Correspondence and General Papers, PHi. Bingham, a wealthy Philadelphia merchant, was in New York City representing Pennsylvania in Congress.

2. The reference is to Coxe's essay signed "A Pennsylvanian" that was first published in the *Pennsylvania Gazette* on 11 June (immediately above).

William Smith to Abraham Yates, Jr.

Manor St. George, 12 June 1788¹

I have not heard from you this Great While I Assure you my Disposition towards you Doth not Subside and I Dont entertain the least Suspition it Does on your part, pray let me have an Epistle from you every Good Oppertunity. I believe Your Annimal Spirits is raised to a Considerable height on Account of the New Constitution it Strikes me With Amaisement that Good Whiggs Who Suffered and underwent